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Abstract 
 
This work aims at identifying the determinants that explain the growth of 
Portuguese public expenditures since the end of II World War. For the Portuguese reality, it 
is one of the first attempts to discuss a large set of simultaneously tested determinants. For 
this purpose, the methodology started from a model that tries to identify public 
expenditures to a system of simultaneous macroeconomic forces and, for testing, it 
followed the steps associated to the cointegration analysis. Using the most convenient 
techniques, a restrictive set of four variables (Number of Unemployed People, Number of 
Public Employees, Rate of Openness and Current Transfers per capita) was found among 
the wider set suggested by the Literature. The variable associated to the dominant force is 
the Number of Unemployed, whose percentual increase promotes a raise of almost 0,30% 
of Portuguese real total expenditures. 
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1.  Introduction 
It is widely recognized that public expenditures have significantly increased worldwide after the II 
World War. In spite of this evidence, the reasons that can explain this movement are not so consensual. 
Some authors (see Bird, 1971; Buchanan and Wagner, 1977; or Becker, 1983) argue that the main 
factors are located in the demand of public goods or services while others defend that the focus should 
be put on the supply side (see Baumol, 1967; Wildavksy, 1964; or Niskanen, 1971). The first group 
mainly accuses the determinants of collective choice that induce significant social transformations, 
promoting an increasing demand for the public role. The second group uses that main assumption of 
opportunistic public rulers, who try to signal competence recurring to the management of public 
outlays. 
For the Portuguese case, there is an abundant literature specifically focusing descriptive studies 
and normative perspectives. Under the aim of enunciating some of these works, we can point Carreira 
(1989), Silva and Neves (1992), Afonso (2000) or Bronchi (2003). Generally pointed, these studies 
discuss probable reasons for the increasing movement of Portuguese public expenditures, but they did 
not supply empirical data, synthesizing their discussions with idiosyncratic postulates, describing co-
movements of the public series (for instances, the increasing trend of public expenditures, public 
revenues, social security outlays and the ageing people) or treating the expenditures as a unique 
aggregate and overpassing the particularities of the component series. For the Portuguese reality, this 
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work is one of the first attempts to discuss a large set of simultaneously tested determinants, respecting 
the individual movement of each public outlay. 
The Portuguese Public Expenditures reveal a notorious growth until the beginnings of the 1980. 
Since this period, the evolution has not been characterized by so significant rates. Until 1980, the 
average growth rate of this macroeconomic aggregate was 9.2%. Since then, the average growth rate 
has rounded the value of 8.8%. As a proportion of real GNP, Portuguese real Public Expenditures grew 
from the 13% (of 1947) to the 42% (of nowadays). These values can be confirmed in Mourão (2006). 
The graphs of the series analyzed in this work can be observed in the Figure 1.1 (at the Annex) 
 
Figure 1.1: Portuguese Real Aggregate, Current and Capital Public Expenditures (1947-2002, log scale) 
 
 
 
Legend: LDESPTR, Aggregate Exp.; LCORR, Current Exp.; LCAPR, Capital Exp.; D(LDESPTR), First differences of LDESPTR; D(LCORRR), First 
differences of LCORRR; D(LCAPR), First differences of LCAPR. 
 
Particularly, this research has the goal of identifying the determinants that have been 
influencing the movements perceived in the Portuguese public expenditures since 1947. According to 
Albi, González-Páramo and Zubiri (2000), we can reach biased results if we only consider the 
aggregate public expenditures as a single dependent variable. Because of the possibility of some of the 
determinants specifically influencing some of the expenditures, I disaggregated the total expenditures 
into their economic components (current and capital spending). As suggested by Stock and Watson 
(1993) or Oxley and McAleer (1999), I recurred to various estimation methods to get the aimed 
elasticities from a long-term public demand function. 
Using the most convenient techniques, a restrictive set of four variables (Number of 
Unemployed People, Number of Public Employees, Rate of Openness and Current Transfers per 
capita) was found among the wider set suggested by the Literature. The variable associated to the 
dominant force is the Number of Unemployed, whose percentual increase promotes a raise of almost 
0,30% of Portuguese real total expenditures. 
These achievements demonstrate that the Portuguese Public Sector is particularly dependent of 
the size of bureaucracy and of the evolution in the international markets, while suppliers of Portuguese 
public orders. Additionally, these results also confirm that the role of redistributive agent can 
significantly explain the movements of the spending of the Portuguese Republic. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the second section, I suggest the review of the most 
relevant literature; in the third, I introduce the structural demand function and the used data; in the 
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fourth, I briefly describe the methodology and the obtained major results. Finally, in the fifth, I 
conclude. 
 
 
2.  Theories on the growth of Public Expenditures: a synthesis 
Although the alternative classifications from Holsey and Borcherding (1997) or Mastromatteo (2003), 
the following theories are considered according to the most observed typology, as stated by authors 
like Albi, González-Páramo and Zubiri (2000), Legrenzi (2001) or Kheng (2001). These authors group 
the theories on the growth of public expenditures into two categories: theories that mainly recognize 
the pressure on Demand side (with the assumption of the neutrality of public agents) and theories that 
deny the neutrality of decision-makers defending the relevance of the Supply side action. 
The theories, that immediately follow, belong to the group of the Demand-side Theories. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Adolph Wagner (1883) enunciated two purposes of 
explanation on the growth of public expenditures. The first of Wagner’s explanations identified the 
social transformation between a society based on primary activities (as agriculture or fishery) and a 
society with the rising of the industrial sector. The second “law” of Wagner suggested that public 
goods were characterized by higher income elasticities (as, in a microeconomics context, the luxury 
goods): so, with rising national product and national income, public expenditures tended to grow. Thus, 
the common exogenous variable to explain the growth of public expenditures is national product. More 
recently, some authors argue that other social transformations must be considered and they include the 
proportion of residents older than 65 years as alternative explicative variable. 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961) identified “Displacement Effects” as a reason for the shift of the 
demand of public goods and services. Facing obligations assumed during special periods, like wars or 
social convulsions, governments have difficulties when they try to re-establish the structures of public 
expenditures, which were verified before these unusual moments. Therefore, after these moments, 
there is a tendency to increase the amount of public outlays. 
Other authors, like Downs (1957), Romer and Rosenthal (1978) or Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
appealed to the redistribution processes as a possible cause of public growth expenditures. According 
to the Theorem of the Median Voter of Downs (1957), the politicians will search to satisfy the 
preferences of the median voter (observing an ordinary scale of some measurable variable, like 
personal income). Therefore, democratic elected governments will try to please this representative 
voter, enlarging her endowments, especially through current transfers. Consequently, a very suggestive 
explicative variable of the growth of public outlays should be the identified with the movement of real 
Current Transfers per capita. 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) or Romer (1999) argue that imperfect knowledge promote the 
growth of budgetary deficits (a popular example are the Puviani-types of introducing “fiscal illusion”, 
usually computed recurring to ratios built upon the proportion between the direct, more visible, and the 
indirect, less visible, taxes). In the context of understanding what stresses public expenditures attending 
on the demand side, Tabellini and Alesina (1990) wrote about the public strategic debt choice, Rogoff 
(1990) pointed fiscal cycles as possible reasons and Alesina and Drazen (1991) studied the absence of 
an agreement among political forces. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Cameron (1978) and Becker (1983) also appreciated the role of 
lobbying groups as motors of the growth of public expenditures. Specifically, these lobbying groups 
have preferences for certain kind of politics and they try to delegate these preferences into the decision-
makers. Cameron (1978), for instances, found that the Openness Rate of a country has a positive 
correlation with the public expenditures, which could be easily understandable to the Portuguese 
economy, as a small open one. 
However, there remains a set of authors who argue that the strongest focus on the public growth 
expenditures should be put on Supply-Side. A synthesis of their suggestions is the following. 
Baumol (1967) and Beck (1981) identify the relative prices (between private and public 
deflators) and the inelastic public demand as the main cause of the evolution of the public budgetary 
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outlays. Because of these assumptions, public expenditures should be studied after being deflated, i.e., 
as real aggregates. 
Frey and Schneider (1981) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) can be pointed as the seminal authors 
who wrote about the temporal proximity between electoral moments as responsible determinants for 
public expenditures cyclical peaks. The set of tests on this particular hypothesis usually recurs to time 
series procedures, namely the estimation of error-correction models. However, as Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) notice, this hypothesis is strategically relevant to study short-term movements and not so much 
to analyse long-term relations, here aimed. 
Niskanen (1971) and Romer and Rosenthal (1978) study this problem according to an Adverse 
Selection perspective: because of the absence of precise knowledge of budget consequences, decision-
makers, often, make the most expensive choice. This choice is especially interesting to bureaucrat 
groups. Consequently, a larger number of public employees promote a double effect on the public 
expenditures aggregate: it carries a natural stress on the public wages value but, additionally, it will be 
permanently increasing because this strategy is a strong-dominant one to the bureaucrat player in most 
of the models. 
Bush and Denzau (1977), Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Cameron (1978) and Castles (1982) 
also observe the bureaucratic preferences, but now bureaucrats are studied as representative voters. 
This assumption is based on the observation that the direct and the indirect number of voters depending 
on the public employment is considerable high (on average, twenty percent in OECD, also considering 
other possible voters in the familiar nucleus of a bureaucrat). Therefore, political measures that reduce 
the acquired rights of public employees are hardly accepted by the opinion polls and, conversely, 
political measures that increment the size of public agencies are well accepted by the voters. 
Castles (1982) developed other explanation - he finds ideological differences (of “right” or 
“left” parties) as contributors to the observed differences in outlays during legislative governments. 
According to him, “left” parties (like socialist or communist ones) are more willing to spend. However, 
studies of Esping-Andersen (1990) or of Moon (2001) identify considerable methodological problem 
on these works (“what is a left party?”) and verify that the results are not consensual. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1977) and Oates (1985) advise to the heterogeneous bias because of 
decentralized decisions (sometimes, there is an increment of public expenditures, sometimes, a 
reduction is observed). Thus, the proportion between the local and the total public revenues must also 
be studied as a potential contributor to the increasing of public spending. 
Wildavsky (1964) recognizes that institutional causes (for example, what is behind a budgetary 
decision, what are the motivations of public agents, what are their typical behaviour) may influence the 
rhythms of public expenditures growth. Therefore, if public employees are used to have increasing real 
wages year after year, it becomes strictly hard not to respect this “rule” and reducing public 
expenditures when necessary. 
 
 
3.  The Model and Data 
The goal of this work is to identify the determinants that can be recognized as responsible for the 
growth of Portuguese public expenditures since the end of the II World War and to estimate their 
elasticities. Consequently, we have two main groups of public expenditures, recurring to the economic 
classification: the current (expenditures related to the daily work of the public sector) and the capital 
ones (outlays associated to the public investment). The arithmetic sum of them will result in the total 
public expenditures. According to Beck (1981) and to Tridimas (1992), these three variables have to be 
considered in real terms, due to the effect of the evolution of the prices related to public consumption 
that magnifies the nominal values. For this purpose, I recurred to weight the different deflators1 of the 
                                                 
1  According to Beck (1981), since the public expenditures are the result of the acquisition of mix goods (that have simultaneous characteristics of strictly 
public and strictly private goods), they must be deflated by a weighted product of the Deflator of the Public Consumption with the Deflator of the 
Private Consumption. Neves (1996), Pinheiro (1997) and the Ministry of the Economy supply these Deflators for Portugal, respectively, between 1947 
and 1955, between 1956 and 1995, and between 1996 and 2002. 
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public series à la Paasche, following Beck (1981), to generate the final deflator, which deflated the 
aggregate, the current and the capital expenditures. The logarithmizations of the real values of the 
outlays are identified by LDESPTR (real total public expenditures), LCORRR (real current 
expenditures) and LCAPR (real capital expenditures). 
According to the previous theories, we have to recognize that total expenditures are like the 
resulting force ( rF ) – the demand quantities of a good - of a system of n simultaneous forces ( iF ) – the 
determinants of this demand, the macroeconomic outlays pointed as potentially influential on the 
target-aggregate. 
Following the typical vectorial annotation, then we can write 
∑== ni ir FF 1  (3.1) 
However, different evolutions of different determinants motive changes in the resulting 
demanded quantities: 
iii amF
ρ*=  (3.2) 
where im  is the mass/magnitude of the determinant and ia
ρ
 its acceleration/change. 
Thus, when trying to test the significance of all of the forces acting on a system (deriving the 
relevant forces on it) we must start from the relation 
∑
=
++=
n
i
iiir uamF
1
* ρα
 (3.3) 
Concretising in our work, we are able to write 
t
k
j
jjt uzLEXP t ++= ∑=1 *δα  (3.4) 
The equation (3.4) also follows Kirchgassner and Pommerehne (1997) who, alternatively, had 
derived it after a discussion of a median voter model. LEXPt is identified with the set of the variables 
LDESPTR, LCORRR and LCAPR and zt with the set of k long-term determinants. 
I used the following logaritmized variables (suggested by the previous review of Literature, in 
the Section 2) to discuss the determinants that can explain the movement of the Portuguese public 
expenditures: Number of Unemployed2 (LDESEMP), real Gross Domestic Product3 (LPIBR), total 
Public Revenues4 (LREC), Number of Public Employees5 (LFUN), rate of openness6 (LTXAB), 
proportion between the direct and the indirect taxes7 (LDIR), proportion between the local and the total 
public revenues8 (LLOC), proportion of Portuguese residents older than 65 years9 (LIDOS), municipal 
electoral years10 (dummy, AUTARQ), legislative electoral years11 (dummy, AREP), years characterized 
by a parliamentary majority of “left” parties12 (dummy, COR) and real Current Transfers per capita13 
(LTRACORP). Although the justification behind the choice for each one of these explicative variables 
is rather clear following the Section 2, a full explanation and a full statistical description is found in 
Mourão (2004) 
All of these annual variables were observed between 1947 and 2002. Their main sources were 
Pinheiro (1997), the annual governmental report of national Public Finances (“Conta Geral do Estado”, 
                                                 
2 According to (AT), Frey and Schneider (1978). 
3 AT Wagner (1883) or Bird (1971). 
4 AT Wildavsky (1964). 
5 AT Buchanan and Tullock (1962) or Cameron (1978). 
6 AT Cameron (1978). 
7 AT Buchanan and Wagner (1977). 
8 AT Brennan and Buchanan (1977). 
9 AT Wagner (1883) or Bird (1971). 
10 AT Frey and Schneider (1978). 
11 AT Frey and Schneider (1978). 
12 AT Cameron (1978) or Castles (1982). 
13 AT Downs (1957) or Meltzer and Richard (1981). 
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CGE), from the “Direcção Geral do Orçamento”, and the National Institute of Statistics (“Instituto 
Nacional de Estatísticas”). The Table 3.2 particularizes the sources. 
 
Table 3.2: Explanatory variables (determinants) and their sources 
 
LDESEMP 1947 a 1995: Pinheiro (1997) 
 1996 a 2002: GEE 
LPIB-LDPIB 1947 a 1953: Andrade (2000) 
 1954 a 1995: Pinheiro (1997) 
 1996 a 2002: GEE 
LREC 1947 a 1995: Pinheiro (1997) 
 1996 a 2002: CGE 
LFUN 1947 a 1989: Neves (1994) 
 1990 a 2002: IEFP 
LTXAB 1947 a 1995: Pinheiro (1997) 
 1996 a 2002: GEE 
LDIR 1947 a 1995: Pinheiro (1997) 
 1996 a 2002: CGE 
LLOC 1947 a 1995: Pinheiro (1997) 
 1996 a 2002: OE 
LIDOS 1947 a 2002: INE 
AUTARQ 1947 a 2002: CNE 
AREP 1947 a 2002: CNE 
COR 1947 a 2002: CNE 
LTRACORP 1947 a 1995: Pinheiro (1997) 
 1996 a 2002: CGE 
 1947 a 2002: INE 
Note: LDPIB: (log) Deflator of the Gross National Product; Sources of LDPIB: between 1947 and 1955, Valério et al. (1989), between 1956 and 1995, 
Pinheiro (1997), and between 1996 and 2002, the Ministry of the Economy (GEE department). Confirm the full sources at the section “References”. 
 
 
4.  Methodology and Results 
To study the long-term relation among variables, econometricians have been purposing the analysis on 
the possibility of cointegration regressions, since the seminal works of Sargan (1964), Davidson, 
Hendry, Srba and Yeo (1978) or Engle and Granger (1987). Some important synthesis on the 
cointegration theme can be found in Haldrup (1998) or Oxley and McAleer (1999). 
In a preliminary task, it is needed to characterize the integration level of each variable. For this 
purpose, I firstly used the popular Augmented Dickey-Fuller14 (ADF) test. For discussing the preferred 
number of lags in each regression of test, it was used the Schwarz Information Criteria. 
The results suggest that the series LREC and LIDOS are I(2) while all the others are I(1). 
According to Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996), the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test can 
reveal serious problems if there is a short sample of observations. In order to overpass this limitation, I 
followed their purpose to test the presence of unit-roots in all the variables. The results were 
convergent to those achieved with the ADF. I also found the previous suggestion using the Leybourne 
and McCabe (1994) test: all the series are I(1), except LREC and LIDOS. 
The Table 4.1 returns the statistical values of the three analyzed series (LDESPTR, LCORRR 
and LCAPR), according to the cited tests. 
                                                 
14 AT Dickey and Fuller (1979) and MacKinnon (1996). 
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Table 4.1:  Statistical values from the unit roots tests of the studied stochastic series 
 
ty  t
d y∆
 
DF-GLS ADF Leybourne and McCabe (1994) 
   Inter Inter/Tend Inter Inter/Tend 
LCORR-
LDDESP 
d=0 -0,873(1) -0,773(1) -0,252(3) 3,748(1)*** 0,668(1)*** 
 d=1 -4,108(3)*** -4,073(1)*** -4,123(1)*** 0,198(3) 0,101(3) 
 d=2 -9,180(1)*** -9,249(2)*** -10,194(1)*** 0,078(1) 0,070(1) 
LCAP-LDDESP d=0 -0,214(1) -0,100(1) 0,538(1) 4,101(1)*** 0,726(1)*** 
 d=1 -5,635(3)*** -5,632(1)*** -5,951(1)*** 0,114(3) 0,106(3) 
 d=2 -9,333(6)*** -9,405(1)*** -10,377(1)*** 0,087(6) 0,083(6) 
LDESEMP d=0 -1,673(3) -1,589(2) -1,209(2) 3,312(3)*** 0,597(3)*** 
 d=1 -5,209(1)*** -5,197(1)*** -5,441(1)*** 0,138(1) 0,128(1)* 
 d=2 -7,440(3)*** -7,473(3)*** -8,111(3)*** 0,016(3) 0,085(3) 
LPIB-LDPIB d=0 -1,619(1) -1,534(3) -1,144(3) 3,341(3)*** 0,602(1)*** 
 d=1 -4,362(2)*** -4,333(1)*** -4,428(1)*** 0,184(2) 0,040(2) 
 d=2 -8,802(2)*** -8,863(1)*** -9,741(1)*** 0,058(2) 0,036(2) 
LREC d=0 -0,054(3) 0,063(3) 0,729(3) 4,196(3)*** 0,740(3)*** 
 d=1 -1,956(2) -1,878(2) -1,548(2) 3,157(2)*** 0,572(2)*** 
 d=2 -9,404(2)*** -9,478(2)*** -10,463(2)*** 0,090(2) 0,089(2) 
LFUN d=0 -0,740(3) -0,637(3) -0,092(3) 3,821(3)*** 0,680(3)*** 
 d=1 -4,460(3)*** -4,433(3)*** -4,545(3)*** 0,079(3) 0,003(3) 
 d=2 -6,213(1)*** -6,221(1)*** -6,642(1)*** 0,008(1) 0,002(1) 
LTXAB d=0 -0,999(3) -0,901(2) -0,402(2) 3,679(3)*** 0,657(3)*** 
 d=1 -7,080(1)*** -7,106(1) -7,680(1)*** 0,360(1)* 0,117(1) 
 d=2 -10,321(2)*** -10,413(1)*** -11,559(1)*** 0,149(2) 0,017(2) 
LDIR d=0 -2,466(3) -2,398(3) -2,158(2) 2,879(3)*** 0,526(3)*** 
 d=1 -7,303(2)*** -7,334(2)*** -7,948(2)*** 0,238(2) 0,096(2) 
 d=2 -9,292(2)*** -9,363(2)*** -10,328(2)*** 0,084(2) 0,080(2) 
LLOC d=0 0,877(3) 1,014(3) 1,844(3) 4,704(2)*** 0,823(3)*** 
 d=1 -4,139(2)*** -4,105(1)*** -4,160(3)*** 0,197(2) 0,037(2) 
 d=2 -7,932(2)*** -7,975(1)*** -8,699(1)*** 0,105(2) 0,004(2) 
LIDOS d=0 -0,353(2) -0,242(1) 0,371(1) 4,032(2)*** 0,714(2)*** 
 d=1 -2,440(4) -2,371(1) -2,126(1) 2,893(4)*** 0,529(4)*** 
 d=2 -7,235(2)*** -7,264(2)*** -7,865(2)*** 0,275(2) 0,103(2) 
LTRACORP d=0 -0,487(2) -0,379(2) 0,210(2) 3,959(2)*** 0,702(2)*** 
 d=1 -4,889(1)*** -4,871(1)*** -5,059(1)*** 0,156(1) 0,031(1) 
 d=2 -9,370(1)*** -9,443(1)*** -10,421(1)*** 0,089(1) 0,008(1) 
Legend: LCORR-LDDESP = LCORRR; LCAP-LDDESP = LCAPR; LPIB-LDPIB = LPIBR 
Notes: Significance levels: 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
In the second column, d=x identifies the x-th difference of the series. 
Between parentheses, the preferred number of lags according to the Schwartz Criteria, in the ADF tests (Inter – with Interception, Inter/Tend – with 
Interception and Trend), or according to Ng and Perron (2001) in the DF-GLS and Leybourne-McCabe (1994) tests. 
 
For confirming the existence of double unit-roots, I used the Dickey-Pantula (1987) suggestion. 
This test also recognized the earlier proposals. 
 
Table 4.2: Statistical values from the Dickey-Pantula test of the most probable I(2) series analyzed 
 
ty  2ˆ/2ˆ θσθ  3ˆ/3ˆ θσθ  
LREC -0,934 -10,857*** 
LIDOS -1,313 -8,333*** 
Note: Significance level: 1% (***). 
 
After these proceedings, the regressions were initially estimated by Static Ordinary Least 
Squares. As stated by Krolzig and Hendry (2001), some of the variables may not be characterized by 
significant coefficients. Consequently, a second estimation must be computed, now omitting the non-
significant variables15. 
                                                 
15 In this step, the non-significant variables were LREC, LIDOS, AUTARQ, AREP, and COR, replicating the results of Imbeau and Chenard (2002). 
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Since only rested I(1) variables in this phase, the null hypothesis of no-cointegration was then 
evaluated using Engle-Granger-type tests with MacKinnon (1996) tables. Observing those results (see 
Table 4.3), we can suspect that there are long-term relations among: 
a) the (log of the) real Total Public Expenditures and the (logs of the) Number of Unemployed, 
the real Gross Domestic Product, the Number of Public Employees, the rate of Openness, the 
percentual relation of the direct taxes to the indirect ones, the proportion of local public 
revenues and the real Current Transfers per capita; 
b) the (log of the) real Current Expenditures and the (logs of the) Number of Unemployed, the real 
Gross Domestic Product, the Number of Public Employees, the percentual relation of the direct 
taxes to the indirect ones, the proportion of local public revenues and the real Current Transfers 
per capita; 
c) the (log of the) real Capital Expenditures and the (logs of the) percentual relation of the direct 
taxes to the indirect ones and the real Current Transfers per capita. 
 
Table 4.3: Estimations from the long-term regressions, SOLS 
 
 Regressands 
Regressors LDESPTR LCORRR LCAPR 
LDESEMP 0,113*** 0,121*** NS 
 (0,030) (0,025)  
LPIBR 0,910*** 0,923*** NS 
 (0,062) (0,051)  
LFUN 0,298*** 0,501*** NS 
 (0,130) (0,120)  
LTXAB 0,202** NS NS 
 (0,099)   
LDIR 0,190*** 0,194*** 0,356*** 
 (0,068) (0,053) (0,117) 
LLOC -0,142** -0,177*** NS 
 (0,062) (0,046)  
LTRACORP 0,198** 0,197*** 0,707*** 
 (0,074) (0,028) (0,014) 
R2 0,999 0,999 0,990 
DW 1,288 1,493 0,847 
ADF -5,107 -5,603*** -3,732* 
Notes: Significance levels: 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) – In the cells concerning the estimation of the coefficients, the null hypothesis is identified 
with the non-significance of the results while the null hypothesis related to the values in the last line (ADF statistic on the residual series) is 
identified with the non-cointegration among the regressands and the regressors according to critical values specified in MacKinnon (1996). 
Between parentheses, below the estimated coefficients, the standard errors are exhibited. “NS” signifies that the estimated coefficient was not 
significant in previous estimations and “NA” signifies that the hypothesis of the homogeneity of the regressor was considered in the estimation. 
 
After this step, it was observed that the coefficient associated to the (logs of the) real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) had a value around “1”, in the regressions that had the logaritmized real total 
expenditures or the real current expenditures as dependent variables. Then, according to these results, 
we can accept the hypothesis of the homogeneity of the Product, what promotes new estimations using 
the previous variables (LDESPTR and LCORRR) as ratios of the real GDP. Briefly commenting the 
other coefficients, we can confirm the correction of the returned signs according to the theory (negative 
sign characterizing LLOC and positive sign characterizing the others regressors). 
The Table 4.4 expresses the results from the set of estimations using the hypothesis of the 
homogeneity of the Product with LDESPTR and LCORRR as regressands. 
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Table 4.4: SOLS estimation 
 
 Regressands 
Regressors LDESPTR-LPIBR LCORRR-LPIBR LCAPR 
LDESEMP 0,140*** 0,147*** NS 
 (0,020) (0,021)  
LPIBR NA NA NS 
LFUN 0,197** 0,328*** NS 
 (0,088) (0,088)  
LTXAB 0,159** NS NS 
 (0,067)   
LDIR 0,195*** 0,194*** 0,356*** 
 (0,052) (0,053) (0,117) 
LLOC -0,180*** -0,166*** NS 
 (0,029) (0,030)  
LTRACORP 0,208** 0,197*** 0,707*** 
 (0,027) (0,028) (0,014) 
R2 0,994 0,993 0,990 
DW 1,373 1,393 0,847 
ADF -5,815** -5,475** -3,732* 
Notes: the same of Table 4.3 
 
For building the intervals of values containing the efficient estimations, I followed the 
suggestion of Stock and Watson (1993). Under this suggestion, the researcher also has to recur to the 
Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) and to the Non-linear Least Squares (NLS) estimations. 
According to Stock and Watson (1993), this procedure produces a range of values (from the lowest to 
the highest values of the set of the estimation methods) that avoids some usual estimation errors, which 
can be the result, for example, of structural breaks not easily identifiable. Synthesizing the findings, 
Table 4.5 shows the range of values of the estimated elasticities omitting the cases where the intervals 
had a negative value as the lowest boundary and simultaneously a positive value as the highest 
boundary (which could be associated to non-significant true coefficients). 
 
Table 4.5: Range of true values from combining the estimations of the SOLS, DOLS and NLS methods 
 
 Regressands 
Regressors LDESPTR-LPIBR LCORRR-LPIBR LCAPR 
LDESEMP [0,140; 0,295] [0,147; 0,261] NS 
LPIBR NA NA NS 
LFUN [0,119 ; 0,208] [0,328 ; 0,416] NS 
LTXAB [0,046 ; 0,159] NS NS 
LDIR NP [0,010; 0,194] [0,084; 0,263] 
LLOC NP NP NS 
LTRACORP [0,061; 0,208] [0,099; 0,197] [0,707; 0,736] 
Note: “NS” signifies that the estimated coefficient was not significant in previous estimations. “NA” signifies that the hypothesis of the homogeneity of the 
regressor was considered in the estimation. “NP” signifies that the combining values did not reveal a range characterized only by negative or 
positive estimations. 
 
Suggesting an economically intuitive interpretation of the results, we can point that an increase 
of 1% in the Number of Portuguese Unemployed can raise the size of the real total public expenditures 
in the real GDP between 0,14% and 0,30%. 
The Number of Portuguese Unemployed is also the variable whose change is more likely 
followed by a raise in the size of Portuguese public expenditures. 
Relating to LLOC and LDIR, the estimations of the three methods (SOLS, DOLS and NLS) 
generated intervals that have negative and positive values, which do not allow recognizing the 
confirmation of the hypotheses of centralization and the fiscal illusion as determinants of the 
Portuguese aggregate public expenditures, by an unequivocal way. 
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Observing the current and the capital expenditures, the variables that strongly influence these 
Portuguese outlays are the relation between direct and indirect taxes and the real Current Transfers per 
capita. 
These results are according to some of the previously suggested theories, such like the 
redistribution processes (via capital transfers), the political-economic cycles (evaluated by the number 
of unemployed people), the fiscal illusion hypothesis (operated in particular components of the 
aggregate expenditures, like the capital ones, and not in the aggregate) and the bureaucratic theory (via 
the induced movement of an increasing number of public employees). 
Some European studies that corroborate these findings are the works of Castronova (2002), 
Jeanneney and Hua (2004) and Crepaz and Moser (2004). 
Cunha and Braz (2003) and Cardoso (2004) are examples of works subscribing these findings, 
particularly the relationship between the Number of Public Employees and the size of Portuguese 
Current Expenditures. 
As a synthesizing message, these results offer an evidence for the relevance of public 
employees as a source of long-term growth of public expenditures. Additionally, it is proved that 
Portuguese real public expenditures are strictly dependent on the economic cycle, being often used as 
an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization in order to minimize the harmful of the unemployment. 
Finally, other motivations that explain the long-term path of the studied aggregate – the public outlays 
– are the redistribution process (through the manipulation of current transfers) and the fiscal illusion, 
two fields that deserve a deep focus in further researches. 
According to Engle and Granger (1987), in order to evaluate the dynamics of the Cointegration 
Model, given the rejection of the hypothesis of non-cointegration among the variables, it is useful to 
recur to an Error Correction Model (ECM). The estimation of an ECM returns the proportion of the 
correction of the short-term deviations (λ) related to a long-term value of equilibrium. 
Taking the equation 3.4, its ECM can be suggested by the equation 3.5 : 
tt
k
j
jjt zuzLEXP t ++∆+=∆ −=∑ 11 *)(*)( λδα  (3.5) 
Following Hendry (1995), the researcher has to include a previous large number of lags of the 
regressors (zj) in equation 3.5 and, gradually, he has to eliminate the least significant, observing criteria 
like the Schwarz Information one. 
The Table 4.6 shows the results reached for each regressand of the previous estimations. 
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Table 4.6: ECM estimations 
 
 Regressands 
∆ ∆ ∆ Regressors (LDESPTR-LPIBR) (LCORRR-LPIBR) (LCAPR) 
∆ 0,158(0)*** 0,149(0)*** NS 
(LDESEMP) (0,025) (0,027)  
∆ NA NA NS 
(LPIBR)    
∆ 0,059(0) 0,278(0)* NS 
(LFUN) (0,174) (0,144)  
∆ 0,192(0)*** NS NS 
(LTXAB) (0,067)   
∆ 0,098(0)* 0,084(0)* 0,398(0)*** 
(LDIR) (0,050) (0,048) (0,124) 
∆ -0,059(0) -0,100(0)** NS 
(LLOC) (0,056) (0,046)  
∆ 0,362(0) 0,216(0)** 0,674(0)** 
(LTRACORP) (0,071) (0,048) (0,110) 
ut-1 -0,527*** -0,695*** -0,433*** 
 (0,136) (0,136) (0,116) 
R2 0,709 0,717 0,386 
χ2(Norm) 0,369 1,136 2,689 
F(AR) 1,272 0,559 0,713 
F(ARCH) 0,440 0,448 1,069 
F(HET) 1,153 0,605 0,710 
Notes: Significance levels: 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) – In the cells concerning the estimation of the coefficients, the null hypothesis is identified with 
the non-significance of the results while the null hypotheses related to the values in the last four lines (normality of the residual series, Breusch-
Godfrey test with 4 lags, ARCH with 4 lags and Test for the Heteroskedasticity) are identified with the normality of the residual series, the absence 
of autocorrelation, the non-identification of the residual series with an auto-regressive conditional heteroskedasticity model and the absence of 
residual heteroskedasticity. Between parentheses, below the estimated coefficients, the standard errors are exhibited. . Between parentheses, 
immediately following the estimated coefficients, the preferred lag of the first difference of the regressor is exhibited, according to Hendry (1995). 
“NS” signifies that the estimated coefficient was not significant in the previous estimations and “NA” signifies that the hypothesis of the 
homogeneity of the regressor was considered in the estimation. 
 
Commenting the results from Table 4.6, we observe that all the estimated λ are negative and 
significant. The annual correction of any disturbance oscillates between the 43,3% (LCAPR) and the 
69,5% (LCORRR)16, reaching the conclusion that in almost two years any disturbance is assimilated in 
the long-term model. 
Another interesting result is derived upon the lack of significance of the coefficients associated 
to the (growth17 of the) number of public employees, LFUN, or to the variables LLOC and 
LTRACORP in the ECM of the proportion of the aggregate public expenditures in the Gross National 
Product (column 1 of the results). This result, following Gemell, Morrissey and Pinar (1998), 
recognizes that the variables related to the (growth of the) unemployment, the globalization of the 
economy or to the fiscal illusion hypothesis are more interesting to explain the found annual growth 
rates of the proportion of LDESPTR to the real GNP. 
The non-rejection of the null hypotheses of the four specification tests (normality of the 
residual series, Breusch-Godfrey test with 4 lags, ARCH with 4 lags and Test for the 
Heteroskedasticity) show that there are not relevant specification problems in the estimated ECM. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The goal of this work was to identify determinants that can be recognized as responsible for the growth 
of Portuguese public expenditures. Although there is a substantial branch of Portuguese works that 
                                                 
16 As expected, the estimated correction for LDESPTR-LPIBR (52,7%) reflects the weighted values of the estimated corrections for the components of the 
aggregate public expenditures (current and capital spendings). 
17 The first difference of the log values of a series is rather close to the growth rate between the original values of those observations, using a Taylor series 
approximation. 
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discuss this thematic using normative perspectives, this work offers an original contribution in order to 
empirically point the relevant determinants. 
In detriment of the alternative classifications from Holsey and Borcherding (1997) or 
Mastromatteo (2003), the theories that can explain the studied phenomenon were considered according 
to the most observed typology, as stated by authors like Albi, González-Páramo and Zubiri (2000), 
Legrenzi (2001) or Kheng (2001). These authors assembly the theories on the growth of public 
expenditures into two categories: theories that mainly distinguish the pressure on Demand side (with 
the assumption of the neutrality of public agents) and theories that refute the neutrality of decision-
makers defending the relevance of the Supply side action. 
Using aggregate data (and their components) since 1947, it was found that the variables that 
significantly explain the revealed movement in the real total public expenditures are the Number of 
Unemployed, the Number of Public Employees, the Rate of Openness and the real Current Transfers 
per capita. 
Observing the current and the capital expenditures, the variables that robustly influence these 
Portuguese outlays are the relation between direct and indirect taxes and the real Current Transfers per 
capita. 
These results are according to various of the formerly suggested theories, such like the 
redistribution processes (via capital transfers), the political-economic cycles (evaluated by the number 
of unemployed people), the fiscal illusion hypothesis (operated in particular components of the 
aggregate expenditures, like the capital ones, and not in the aggregate) and the bureaucratic theory (via 
the induced movement of an increasing number of public employees). 
Using ECM estimations, it was verified that the yearly correction of any commotion oscillates 
between the 43,3% (capital component) and the 69,5% (current outlays), getting the conclusion that 
any disturbance is assimilated in the long-term model in almost two years. 
Finally, there is place to warn against a very common statement: these results identify some 
economic aggregates as determinants of the movement associated to the Portuguese Public 
Expenditures. But we can not, aprioristically, infer that they explain with the same statistical quality 
the movement of another (very important) aggregate: the Public Budget, which results from the non-
correspondence between Public Expenditures and Public Revenues. For instances, if a 1%-change in 
the Number of Public Employees increases the value of real Public Expenditures in 0,21% (expected 
maximum), we can not expect the return of the same value in order to evaluate the impact in the Public 
Budget variable. As Public Employees generate product and as they contribute to the Public Revenues, 
this impact would be less than the one obtained in this work. 
In spite of this advertisement, the present work can be observed as a detailed contribution to 
point the determinants that actually explain the growth of Portuguese Public Expenditures, since 1945, 
overpassing the idiosyncratic existent national debate over this relevant thematic. 
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